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Technology Competition and Optimal Investment
Timing: A Real Options Perspective
Robert J. Kauffman and Xiaotong Li
Abstract—Companies often choose to defer irreversible invest-
ments to maintain valuable managerial flexibility in an uncertain
world. For some technology-intensive projects, technology uncer-
tainty plays a dominant role in affecting investment timing. This
article analyzes the investment timing strategy for a firm that is
deciding about whether to adopt one or the other of two incompat-
ible and competing technologies. We develop a continuous-time sto-
chastic model that aids in the determination of optimal timing for
managerial adoption within the framework of real options theory.
The model captures the elements of the decision-making process
in such a way so as to provide managerial guidance in light of ex-
pectations associated with future technology competition. The re-
sults of this paper suggest that a technology adopter should defer
its investment until one technology’s probability to win out in the
marketplace and achieve critical mass reaches a critical threshold.
The optimal timing strategy for adoption that we propose can also
be used in markets that are subject to positive network feedback.
Although network effects usually tend to make the market equilib-
rium less stable and shorten the process of technology competition,
we show why technology adopters may require more technology
uncertainties to be resolved before widespread adoption can occur.
Index Terms—Capital budgeting, decision analysis, investment
timing, network externalities, option pricing, real options, sto-
chastic processes, technology adoption.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE RECENTLY unprecedented development of new tech-nological innovations has yielded many investment oppor-
tunities for firms. However, such innovations are usually asso-
ciated with significant uncertainties that derive from the nature
of the technology itself, the consistency of investor perceptions
about the quality of its solution capabilities, and competition
that is occurring in the market around similar kinds of innova-
tions. As a result, adopting the right technology at the right time
becomes a challenging issue that many managers must face head
on, if they are to achieve effective decisionmaking on behalf of
their firms. In this paper, we propose a new model based on the
theory of real options that is intended to provide senior man-
agers with a tool to address this issue in a manner that balances
effective managerial intuition with a depth of insight that is only
possible with the application of rigorous methods. At the core
of our perspective—and the theory of real options, in a larger
Manuscript received November 1, 2003; revised June 1, 2004. Review of this
manuscript was arranged by Department Editor R. Sabherwal.
R. J. Kauffman is with Information and Decision Sciences, Management
Information Systems (MIS) Research Center, Carlson School of Manage-
ment, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455 USA (e-mail:
rkauffman@csom.umn.edu).
X. Li is with Management Information Systems, Department of Accounting
and Management Information Systems, University of Alabama, Huntsville, AL
35899 USA (e-mail: lixi@uah.edu).
Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TEM.2004.839962
sense—is the idea that every successful business manager must
understand the fundamental tradeoff between risk and reward
[2], [7]. Recent efforts have been made to understand poten-
tial benefits associated with real options in multiple informa-
tion systems (IS) contexts, including software development and
enterprise systems module adoption [71], [72], banking IT in-
frastructures [62], software development project portfolios [9],
and decision support systems [48]. All these papers, however,
deal with investment evaluation problems in the absence of tech-
nology competition.
A. Investment Decisions for Competing Technologies
Very often, however, senior managers must consider whether
and when to adopt one of two incompatible competing technolo-
gies. Leading examples in our time include Sun Microsystems’
Java and J2EE software development environment versus the
Visual Basic, Visual Studio and the Net development envi-
ronments of Microsoft. In addition, there are many cases of
intratechnology competition in which somewhat different, and
somewhat compatible technologies compete within a tech-
nology standard [14], increasing the anxiety of the marketplace
as to how fast it will shift to embrace the new technological
innovations. We need look no farther than recent developments
around the IEEE standards for Wi-Fi fixed location wireless
computing. Although many hardware and software vendors
have been working to create compliant products for the 802.11b
standard, the market has recently been shaken up by indications
that the 802.11g standard offers faster throughput and greater
effective range.
A typical technology investment project requires a significant
initial outlay of capital and is generally either partially or wholly
irreversible. In addition, technology investment projects usually
bear significant business and technological uncertainties, espe-
cially in terms of the variance of future cash flows. Moreover,
it is typical that some of the uncertainties will be resolved as
time passes, changing future period expected values to future
period realized values. The “surprise value” of this information
that is revealed to a decisionmaker in the future has the poten-
tial to change the perceived value of a project and to shift the
sentiments that senior managers express about willingness to
invest [24].
B. Real Options and Technology Adoption
The characteristics that we have just described—risk
expressed in variance terms, and the value of new informa-
tion—make the financial economic theory of real options an
appropriate theoretical perspective for evaluating technology
investment projects under uncertainty and risk [10]. For ex-
ample, some authors have recently written that the theory of
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real options has the potential to play a role in the assessment
of technology investments, business strategies and strategic
alliances in the highly uncertain and technology-driven digital
economy [11], [12], [34], [48]. Although other authors have
written about some of the shortcomings of applying real option
investment evaluation methods [70], its advantages over other
capital budgeting methods [such as static discounted cash
flow or distributed coordination function (DCF) analysis] have
been widely recognized for the analysis of strategic investment
decisions under uncertainty [1], [53], [54], [73]. (For readers
who are not familiar with the real options theory, we provide a
brief and nontechnical introduction in Appendix A.)
Although option pricing theory has been extended beyond the
evaluation of financial instruments, it is important that we cau-
tion the reader to recognize that there are some technical issues
lurking just below the surface of the intuition that deserve our
comment. First, option pricing theory is founded on the market
tradability of the asset on which the option has been created.
Unfortunately though, most knowledgeable observers and op-
tion pricing theorists will point out that technology investment
projects are not subject to the valuation of the market. Moreover,
technology projects are often specific assets for the firms that
invest in them, and as a result, it is unlikely that another iden-
tical project would ever be available in the market on which to
base a comparison. In financial economics terms and to comply
with the requirements of the underlying theory—senior man-
agers who wish to find a traded portfolio that can completely du-
plicate the risk characteristics of the underlying nontraded asset
are likely to be frustrated. Without this twin security, as it is
often referred to in the literature, risk-neutral valuation is diffi-
cult to justify [67], [68]. The result is that the standard “methods
toolkit” for option pricing may be inappropriate to apply.
Second, the business value of a potential investment project
is assumed to follow a symmetric stochastic process. The sto-
chastic process that is most commonly used in real option anal-
ysis is geometric Brownian motion, as illustrated in [57], but
models that incorporate the Brownian geometric motion sto-
chastic process assume that there are no competitive impacts
on the cash flows and future payoffs of the project. The essence
of the concern is the possibility of competition affecting a tech-
nology project investment’s future cash flows. Why? Because
competition is likely to cause the distribution of future project
values to become asymmetric: higher project values are less
likely to occur because of the potential competitive erosion of
value (e.g., [64]).
As Kulatilaka and Perotti [45] and other business innovators
have pointed out, the benefits of early preemptive investment
may strategically dominate the benefits of waiting when the
competition is very intense. These problems associated with tra-
ditional real option modeling motivate us to model technology
investments from a new perspective. Instead of stochastically
modeling the investment project value—as might be the case for
traditional assessment of technology projects using real option
methods—our insight is that the standard Brownian motion can
be used to directly model the technology competition process.
Like Grenadier and Weiss [31], our paper uses the first passage
time of a stochastic process to characterize a random time in
the future. The first passage time is a technical term frequently
used in stochastic analysis. It is the first time for a Brownian mo-
tion to reach a predetermined threshold. See Domine [23] and
Ross [63] for its statistical properties. Grenadier and Weiss [31]
use the first passage time of a geometric Brownian motion to
characterize the random arrival time of a future innovation. Our
paper uses the first passage time of a standard Brownian mo-
tion to characterize the random time at which one technology
wins the competition. The appropriateness of this modeling ap-
proach depends on whether each state of the stochastic process
can be easily and precisely interpreted. In Grenadier and Weiss
[31], each state of the stochastic process corresponds to a cer-
tain expected arrival time of the future innovation. Here, each
state of the stochastic process corresponds to a certain expected
probability for a technology to win the competition. Therefore,
the Brownian motion used in our model can be linked to de-
cisionmakers’ expectations of the outcome of the technology
competition.
C. Process View of Technology Competition
To effectively make our general argument about the appro-
priateness of representing the competitive process that occurs
around a technology investment project, we first bring into
clearer focus what we mean by the “typical process” of tech-
nology competition. Grenadier and Weiss [31] present a model
to describe the IT investment behavior of a company facing
sequential technology innovation. In their model, they identify
four potential technology migration strategies:
• compulsive strategy: purchasing every innovation;
• leapfrog strategy: skipping the earliest version, but
adopting the next generation of an innovation;
• buy-and-hold strategy: only purchasing the early
innovation;
• laggard strategy: waiting for the arrival of new innovation
and then buying the previous innovation.
Using the option pricing approach, they give an analytical
solution from which the probability for a company to pursue
any of the four strategies can be derived. In today’s dynamic
business environment, the process of technology development
is usually both parallel and serial. Therefore, investors not only
care about serial technology migration, but also about the kind
of parallel technology competition that is our focus here. We
note four basic elements of the process of technology competi-
tion that may affect the real option valuation of technology in-
vestment projects. They include the following.
• Problem identification. An important business problem
that the firm faces is identified and new technology solu-
tions are sought to solve it.
• Proposed technology solutions. Technology developers
and vendors make proposals to the firm for different
approaches that they believe will solve the problem.
• Solution testing and comparison. The firm observes dif-
ferent technologies competing in the market and managers
evaluate and test their effectiveness and draw conclusions
based on the appropriate comparisons.
• Technology standardization. Over time, the marketplace
will reveal which technology or technology solution is the
best. As a result, one can expect to see the application of
the technology to solve the problem to become increas-
ingly standardized.
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As a company plans a technology investment when a two-
technology standards battle is present, it usually will face two
questions. Which technology is likely to eventually win the stan-
dards battle? How long will it take for the technology compe-
tition process to end? We will show why the answers to these
two related questions play important roles in a firm’s technology
investment decisionmaking. More specifically, our model sug-
gests that a firm should defer technology adoption and let some
of the relevant uncertainties in the world be resolved before
the technology competition process reaches an investment via-
bility threshold. We will shortly lay out the characteristics of
this threshold. The managerial guidance that we offer is that
firm should adopt a technology immediately if the current state
of technology competition reaches this threshold. We also con-
sider the drivers of competition that affect the market’s ability
to permit this threshold to be reached.
Although our greater focus is on the competition between
incompatible technologies, we also address the more general
issue of compatibility. We will demonstrate how significant
switching costs and possible technology lock-in may give
technology adopters the incentive to wait. Our approach to
understanding this problem is especially accommodating of
scenarios under which strong network effects exist. It turns
out, based on our modeling efforts to develop this theory,
that strong network feedback has the potential to shorten the
technology competition process by increasing the observed
volatility of adopter preferences. The reason why technology
adopters usually will act much more quickly in the presence of
strong network externalities is not because that they can tolerate
the greater uncertainty. Instead, the self-reinforcing network
feedback effects make technology adopters’ expectations reach
the optimal threshold more quickly.
D. Plan of this Paper
The rest of this paper is structured to communicate the anal-
ysis details of the story behind this theory-based interpretation,
and to provide an effective basis for the acceptance of the ways
that we will use the theory of real options to create a new evalua-
tive methodology. In Section II, we begin with a formal presen-
tation of an option-based investment timing model, and show
how we reach a closed-form analytical solution. In Section III,
we show the linear relationship between investors’ expectations
and the optimal timing solution generated by our investment
viability proposition. We also explore the roles of technology
switching costs and network effects in affecting technology in-
vestors’ decisions. In Section IV, we present the results of nu-
merical analyses and simulations that are aimed at showing the
robustness of our modeling approach. Section V concludes the
paper with a discussion of the primary findings and some con-
sideration of the next steps in developing this stream of research.
II. REAL OPTIONS MODEL FOR ADOPTING
OF COMPETING TECHNOLOGIES
We next discuss the setup of an option valuation model for
the adoption of competing technologies. The model is designed
to capture the technology competition that leads to an estab-
lished technological standard as a stochastic process, whose
drift over time presents technology evaluation issues that can be
addressed via the specification of a real option pricing model.
Our modeling choices permit us to assess the appropriate
timing for adoption, based on the use of a ratio metric that
helps a firm to know whether it has reached a threshold beyond
which investment deferral no longer makes sense. (For ease of
reading, our modeling development, we include the modeling
notation and construct definitions in Table I.)
A. Modeling Preliminaries
Consider a risk-neutral firm that faces a technology invest-
ment opportunity. Setting aside the potential outcome of tech-
nology competition for a moment, we will assume that the ex-
pected payoff of the technology investment project is a pos-
itive constant as of the time the technology investment is
made. To implement the technology project, the firm must adopt
one of two competing technologies, called Technology and
Technology . We use a standard Brownian motion with
to characterize the dynamics of competition between
Technology and Technology . The continuous-time sto-
chastic process denotes the state of technology competi-
tion and is the variance parameter that affects the volatility of
. In , is a Wiener increment that has two prop-
erties: 1) with drawn from the normal distribution
and 2) for all .1
In many continuous-time real options models (e.g., [13],
[57]), deterministic drift parameters are included, in addition
to the stochastic parameter. Most of these models use geo-
metric Brownian motions to model investment project values
that stochastically increase over time. The drift term is used
to characterize the deterministic part of the value increment,
and the Wiener process (standard Brownian motion) is used
to characterize the stochastic project value increment. Unlike
these studies, we use Brownian motion to model the technology
competition process, instead of the investment project value.
Therefore, our model does not need the drift term to quantify
the instantaneous project value increment. All it needs is the
Wiener increment (standard Brownian motion) that character-
izes the uncertainties surrounding the technology competition
process.2
After a random time , one of the two technologies and
will prevail and become the standard solution. To model the
time at which the standard emerges, we use an upper boundary
and a lower boundary with .
The technology competition will finish and one technology will
emerge as the standard solution when the stochastic technology
1Two problems arise when Brownian motion is used to model technology
competition. First, it is appropriate to question whether a typical technology
competition process meets the mathematical conditions that define Brownian
motion. Second, it is hard to find managerially observable variables that can be
used to represent a technology competition process. So, it is may be difficult to
interpret the results of the model. To solve these problems, we will provide a
proof that there is a linear mapping between each Brownian motion state and
the probability that a technology will become a standard.
2A standard Brownian motion without the drift term is a martingale. The
martingale property is well known in financial economics related to the in-
formational efficiency of stock prices [50]. Adding the drift term destroys the
property. However, the law of iterated expectations implies that well-behaved
expectations should possess the martingale property. Therefore, we intention-
ally suppressed the drift term to preserve the martingale property, which allows
us to interpret our analytical results in terms of decisionmakers’ expectations of
the future technology competition.
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TABLE I
MODELING NOTATION AND CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS
competition, , reaches either or . If the stochastic
process, , reaches first, then Technology will dom-
inate Technology to become the standard technology at time
. The result will be opposite if reaches first. So an
increase in will make Technology more likely to prevail
in the market and a decrease in will make Technology
less likely to beat Technology in the competition.
The approach that we use to determine the uncertain tech-
nology standardization time is similar to the modeling tech-
nique used in Black and Cox [16], Leland [49], and Grenadier
and Weiss [31]. The outcomes of the technology competition
will affect the payoff of a technology investment project that
adopts either Technology or Technology . To quantify this,
we assume that there is an exogenous gain in investment payoff
at time if the technology adopted becomes the standard. If
the solution adopted fails in the competition, then the value gain
will be 0. We also can assume that there is an exogenous value
loss in this case, but this assumption will not enhance the gen-
erality of our model since we can easily adjust to normalize
this value loss to 0. It may be more helpful for the reader to think
of as a bonus for adopting the “right” technology. The reader
should also note that we assume that the switching costs be-
tween the two incompatible technologies are prohibitively high.
This technology lock-in situation gives the firm little flexibility
to switch once it has adopted one technology.
Let the cost of capital for the technology investment project
be . Since we assumed that is constant over time, the
firm’s technology investment strategy is very simple if no con-
sideration is given to the effect of technology competition be-
tween and . The firm should invest immediately if
, and never invest otherwise. However, the decisionmaking
problem becomes more complicated when we consider the com-
petitive dynamics that may occur between Technology and
Technology . The expected total payoff from the technology
investment with technology competition may be greater than the
baseline expected payoff . Why? Because the firm can gain
if the technology solution it adopts wins the standards race at
time . More importantly—and a factor that makes the theory
of real options especially relevant for our analysis, is that it may
be valuable to defer the investment to resolve the uncertainty
surrounding the two competing technologies.
To derive the firm’s optimal investment strategy, it is neces-
sary to quantify the value of the options that are embedded in the
technology investment opportunity. Before committing to the
investment, the firm has an option to choose one of the two com-
peting technologies. When it decides to invest, the firm exercises
its adoption option, selecting the technology that it believes to
be more promising. The expected investment payoff can be de-
rived by dynamic optimization.
Let denote the expected value gain through the stan-
dardization bonus if the company decides to invest, where is
the state of technology competition. So the expected investment
payoff at is . Note that the company can adopt
either or at the time of the investment. Let and
denote the expected value gain if the company decides
to adopt and at , respectively. For a rational risk-neutral
company that always maximizes its expected investment payoff,
we know that . So, to calculate the
expected investment payoff, we need to derive values for
and .
We first derive . then can be found in a similar
way. Since generates no interim cash flows when is
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between and , Bellman’s principle suggests that the
instantaneous return on should be equal to its expected
capital gain. So must satisfy the equilibrium equation
.
Expanding using Ito’s Lemma3 yields
. By plugging into this
equation, we obtain . Now,




In addition, must satisfy two boundary conditions at
and and
. The first boundary condition says that the firm that adopts
Technology will gain payoff when the state of technology
competition, , reaches first, but if the state of technology,
, reaches first, then the firm will gain nothing. So the
solution to this second order differential equation is
, where
and
For , the solution will also satisfy the Bellman equilib-
rium equation, but the two boundary conditions are
and . The solution is
. Since is monotonically increasing in
and , we can prove that
for
for
Since we know the expected investment payoff at the time of
investment, we are able to find the optimal timing to make the
investment. There are both benefits and costs associated with the
option to defer the investment. Waiting will erode the expected
investment payoff in terms of its present value at time 0. How-
ever, waiting longer will resolve more uncertainties about the
competition between Technology and Technology .
Consider two extreme cases. In the first one, the firm invests
at time 0. So it will maximize the present value of but faces
uncertainties in the technology competition. In the other, the
firm waits until one of the two competing technologies becomes
the standard. At that time, the firm’s expected investment payoff
will be , but the waiting time also will erode this composite
payoff in terms of its present value at time 0. Therefore, the
optimal investment timing strategy must balance the benefits
and costs associated with investment deferral. One may guess
that a firm will invest at some threshold of . We prove this
in the first theorem.
Theorem 1—Optimal Investment Timing Strategy Theorem:
There are two thresholds and , where .
3Ito’s Lemma is a well-known theorem in stochastic calculus that is used to
take the derivatives of a stochastic process. Its primary result is that the second
order differential terms of a Wiener process become deterministic when they are
integrated over time. The interested reader should see Merton [59] for additional
details.
Fig. 1. Symmetric payoffs from firm adoption with competing technologies.
Given , the firm will invest immediately if w is
outside of . Otherwise, it will defer the investment
until reaches either or . If reaches
first, the firm will adopt Technology . If reaches
first, it will adopt Technology .
(See Appendix B for the proof.) Fig. 1 depicts ,
and the continuation region between the optiomal thresholds
and .
We can this apply the optimal timing strategy analysis to sev-
eral special cases. When there is no gain associated with se-
lecting the right technology , it turns out that .
So there will be no need to defer the technology investment.
Waiting in this case has a single impact: it decreases the present
value of the technology payoff, . When , however, we
will see that . In this case, will degrade to a con-
stant and the optimal strategy for the firm will be to invest im-
mediately in the technology project. More generally, the optimal
strategy suggests that the firm will be more willing to defer the
technology investment when is getting smaller or is getting
larger.
We also find that there is a critical ratio between and in
Proposition 1 that can guide investment decisionmaking. The
firm will defer the technology investment until reaches
or when is greater than or equal to the critical
ratio.
Proposition 1—Investment Deferral Tradeoff Threshold Ratio
Proposition: There is a critical ratio, the investment deferral
tradeoff threshold ratio , between and . If the ratio is
greater than or equal to , the optimal investment timing strategy
is to defer the investment until one technology becomes the stan-
dard. The optimal timing solution depends only on , and
not on the separate values of either or .
See the proof in Appendix B.
The Investment Deferral Tradeoff Threshold Ratio Propo-
sition suggests that the adopting firm’s optimal investment
strategy is to defer the investment until all of the relevant uncer-
tainties associated with technology competition are resolved if
. In other words, the firm should defer the investment
20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 52, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2005
until one technology becomes the standard, if the outcome of
the standards battle appears likely to have a significant impact
on the technology investment’s expected payoff. This propo-
sition also says that the actual values of or are irrelevant
to the timing decision as long as we know the ratio between
and , which is intuitively plausible.
For the optimal investment thresholds found in our model, it
is important to show how they are affected by the model param-
eters. Because of the symmetry of our model, we only need to
conduct a comparative static analysis on the positive threshold
. This leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2—Comparative Statics Proposition: For a pos-
itive investment threshold , the following com-
parative static results must hold: , ,
, , and .
See Appendix B for this proof also.
The results of the comparative static analysis are readily in-
terpreted. First, if the gain from adopting the right technology
is large compared to , the firm will wish to wait for more un-
certainty to be resolved with respect to the technology. Second,
because increases in and decreases in will tend to prolong
the technology competition process, the firm will tend to adopt
sooner because the present value of will be smaller. Finally,
increasing the discount rate will make waiting more costly
and, as a result, the firm will tend to shorten its time to adopt.4
We next interpret the results of our model from another
perspective and demonstrate the significance of technology
adopters’ expectations in technology investment timing.
III. SWITCHING COSTS, ADOPTER EXPECTATIONS, AND
NETWORK EFFECTS
We next consider the problems of switching costs and lock-in,
and the role of adopter expectations and network externalities in
technology adoption decisionmaking.
A. Switching Costs and Lock-In
An assumption that we make in this model is that the
switching costs between the two technologies are very high.
Although this assumption may seem restrictive at first, sig-
nificant switching costs are common in technology-intensive
industries and often lead to a situation known as technology
lock-in [26], [43], [74]. Based on the comparative statics results,
we can relax this assumption and examine how decreases in
switching costs affect the optimal investment strategy [52]. In
our model, a decrease in switching costs will affect two param-
eters. The switching costs will dwarf the uncertain exogenous
value gain, , because firms that have adopted the nonstandard
technology may later choose to switch to the standard one at
the expense of some switching costs. Also, the switching costs
increase the investment payoff because a part of becomes
certain. Since the derivatives, and ,
decrease in switching costs, this implies that waiting is less
attractive, but clearly, technology adopters are willing to wait
because they are afraid of getting locked into the nonstandard
4All else equal, the expected time for w(t) to reach +w increases in w .
So here we interpret the comparative statics results in terms of the expected
investment deferral time rather than the actual investment deferral time.
technology. Without proper coordination, significant switching
costs may lead to Pareto-inferior equilibria, and possibly
unacceptably slow, inertial adoption. Consequently, some
technology vendors may voluntarily promote open standards
or technology interoperability to reduce switching costs and to
boost potential adopters’ confidence about the future benefits
stream from the technology.
B. Role of Expectations
As we mentioned earlier, one difficulty that managers will
face in interpreting our model is that the Brownian motion
process that represents the technology competition
process will be hard to define in practice. In Proposition 3, we
show that can be interpreted as the technology adopter’s
expectations of the outcome of the technology competition.
Proposition 3—Expected Technology Standard Proposition:
At point , where , the probability
for Technology to defeat Technology and to become the
future standard is given by . At the
same point in time , the probability for Technology to defeat
Technology and to become the future standard is given by
.
The proof is omitted.5 This proposition basically says that
there is a linear mapping between each point of and the
expected probability for a technology to win the competition.
This mathematic property, coupled with the martingale prop-
erty of the Brownian motion, establishes a direct link between
each decisionmaker’s expectations and the technology compe-
tition process defined in this paper. With knowledge of the
relationship between and the firm’s expectations, we are
able to provide a more precise interpretation of the Optimal In-
vestment Timing Strategy Theorem.
The optimal timing strategy for the risk-neural firm is to defer
the technology investment until it expects that either Technology
or Technology will win the competition with a probability
of . Rational decisionmakers will always adopt
the technology that is expected to have a higher probability to
win. So if hits first, Technology is expected to win
the competition with a probability of .
But if hits first, Technology ought to win with a
probability of . Note that and only depend
on , and not on the separate values of either or . This
interpretation clearly indicates that the technology adopter’s ex-
pectations of future technology competition outcomes play a
crucial role in its investment timing decision.
An important question here is: How can managers observe
the probability of one technology defeating the other? In busi-
ness, decisionmakers cannot observe the state of the stochastic
process directly. Instead, they must rely on their expectations
formed through adaptive learning. Therefore, managers who
want to apply our model need to rely on their subjective ex-
pectations of the future technology competition. Similarly,
Grenadier and Weiss [31] use a geometric Brownian motion to
depict the technological progress. To interpret the stochastic
5The proposition directly follows from the fact that w(t) is a martingale. For
more details about the hitting probabilities of a martingale upon which the proof
is based, we refer the interested reader to Durrett [25].
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process in their model, decisionmakers also need to rely on their
subjective expectations to come up with a reasonable guess of
the expected arrival time of the future innovation. The quality of
managers’ technology adoption decisions depends on how close
their subjective expectations are from the “true” state, which
is generally unobservable. This is not a big problem for those
who believe Muth’s [60] rational expectations theory (such as
Au and Kauffman [4], which offers a first assessment of the
use of rational expectations theory related to IT adoption). In
this theory, economic agents’ subjective expectations that are
formed through adaptive learning should be informed predic-
tions of future events. However, boundedly rational managers
also may sometimes form erroneous subjective expectations
that may negatively affect the quality of their decisions. Indeed,
in some cases, even rational decisionmakers have difficulties
in making informed predictions of future events because of
various informational or incentive problems [39].
As far as the technology vendors are concerned, their abilities
to effectively manage their potential customers’ expectations are
also critical. A commonly used strategy in technology compe-
tition is penetration pricing, where one technology vendor uni-
laterally and aggressively cuts prices to gain market share or
preempt its competitors at an early stage in the technology com-
petition. This strategy not only makes a firm’s technology more
attractive because of the lower price. The vendor also affects
other potential adopters’ expectations by showing its own deter-
mination to win the standards battle. A similar strategy is sur-
vival pricing, where a weak competitor cuts its product’s price
defensively to escape a defeat in a battle involving standards.
A survival strategy is hard to make work, according to Shapiro
and Varian [65], because it negatively affects potential adopters’
expectations by signaling the product’s weakness.
It is worth noting that our model does not analyze the
two pricing strategies. Instead, our discussion of the strategic
pricing issue serves two purposes. First, managers’ expectations
play a significant role in technology adoption decisionmaking.
The opposite effects of the two similar pricing strategies further
underscore the importance of potential adopters’ expectations
in technology competition. Second, technology pricing is an
example of many strategic issues of expectations management
in technology competition. Our discussion here aims to suggest
that many of these issues should be studied in general equi-
librium models that consider the dynamic interaction between
the adopters and technology vendors. In fact, some recent real
options studies advocate using real options games for general
equilibrium analyzes of firms’ investment strategies [32],
[34], [66].
C. Technology Competition With Network Effects
We use continuous-time Brownian motion to directly model
a technology adopter’s expectations that also are subject to con-
tinuous changes. Although we have proved that expectations are
linear in , there is another question that we have not yet
fully addressed. Is it appropriate to assume that the adopter’s ex-
pectations can be characterized by Brownian motion? As long
as the adopter’s expectations are rational and consistent, the
martingale property of is justified by the law of iterated
expectations.6 Since only unpredictable new information can
change the adopter’s expectations, should have a memo-
ryless property.
However, if we use to model some directly observable
variables like each technology’s market share, these two prop-
erties are actually much harder to justify.7 One reason is that
many technology competition processes are subject to positive
network feedback that makes a strong technology grow stronger
[18], [38], [40]. Network effects stem from the efficiencies asso-
ciated with a user base for compatible products. Consequently,
the technology with a larger market share can be expected to
gain more market share from its competitor in our model. But
note that this directly violates the martingale property and can
result in dependent increments (in lieu of memoryless incre-
ments) of the market share. Although network effects do not
undermine our modeling assumptions since we directly model
adopter’ expectations, their relationships with our model should
not be ignored.
In our model, network effects affect the technology adoption
dynamics through two channels: through the technology adopter
and through the market. The externalities created by network ef-
fects usually make it more beneficial to adopt the winning tech-
nology. In our model, the investment threshold ratio
can become larger due to strong network effects. As a result,
the optimal timing threshold will increase. According to our
comparative static results, the technology adopter will require
more certainty about the outcome of the standards battle be-
fore making an investment decision. This effect requires that the
technology adopter be more patient and wait longer to let more
uncertainties in the market be resolved.
But strong network effects usually also result in “tippy” mar-
kets that can significantly shorten the technology competition
process. In markets subject to strong network externalities, any
market equilibrium will be highly unstable and the expected
winning technology may be able to obtain a commanding
market share even in a very short period of time [27], [28]. We
have recently seen this occur with some of the new wireless
technologies and instant messaging services [39]. So network
effects can reduce the expected duration of the technology
competition process in our model by increasing the volatility
of . This also will occur because the expectation of the
random variable representing the time at which a technology
becomes standard in the marketplace monotonically de-
creases in .
To sum up, our model suggests that network externalities ei-
ther cause a delay or expedite technology adoption, but this de-
pends on adopter and market-related factors. In general, strong
6The law of iterated expectations states that today’s expectation of what will
be expected tomorrow for some variable in a latter period, is simply today’s
expectation for the variable’s value in the latter period. For additional details,
the reader should see Walpole et al. [75].
7Issues of this sort frequently arise in the midst of efforts to bring a theoret-
ical perspective into more practical uses for analysis and evaluation. The reader
should recognize this as inevitable, just as the application of agency theory for
contract formation and managerial incentives development (e.g., [5] and [8]),
or the theory of incomplete contracts for interorganizational IS investments and
governance (e.g., [6] and [33]) is founded on relatively strict assumptions. In
spite of this, the theoretical perspectives and the modeling approaches that com-
plement them still offer rich and meaningful managerial insights.
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Fig. 2. Optimal timing strategy: no guarantee technology adopted becomes standard.
network effects tend to result in very fast adoption of the tech-
nology that adopters believe will be most likely to win the stan-
dards competition. In some cases, however, network externali-
ties will make people adopt a technology too early, even though
waiting is Pareto-preferred [3], [20]. A final point suggested
by our model is that technology adopters actually require more
assurance about the future technology standard outcome when
they make technology investment decisions, although network
effects usually speed up their decisions to adopt.
IV. SIMULATION, NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS,
AND INTERPRETATION
This section discusses a firm-level decisionmaking simula-
tion for technology adoption in the presence of a standards battle
between two technologies.
A. Simulation Setup and Outcome
Entry Conditions: We assume that the investment decision
will be irreversible. Once it is made, the firm will be locked into
the costs and benefits stream associated with the adopted tech-
nology. Our goal is to determine the firm’s optimal technology
adoption timing strategy . To initiate this simulation, we re-
quire that the decisionmaker who is contemplating adopting the
technology at the firm will know the following information.
• The decisionmaker’s current expectations of each tech-
nology’s probability to win the standards battle will deter-
mine , the initial state of technology competition.
• The decisionmaker’s current estimate of the duration of
the technology competition process will determine the ap-
propriate values of and .
• The decisionmaker should be able to make a reasonable
estimate of , the ratio between the bonus for adopting
the technology that becomes the standards battle winner,
and the firm’s baseline payoff from investing in the tech-
nology project, regardless of the technology choice.
• The decisionmaker should know the discount rate that
affects the costs of waiting.
We normalize and to 1 for the numerical analysis. The
discount rate is assumed to be 10%. The likelihood that ei-
ther technology will become the standard is 0.50, from which
follows that at time 0. The firm also expects that one of
the two technologies will emerge as the winner in four years.
This assumption causes the numerical value of the standard de-
viation, , to be around 0.50. We also set the value of , the
exogenous gain in business value if the technology becomes a
standard at 0.5 V.
Optimal Timing Results. With these specified parameter
values, we find that the optimal investment threshold is
0.2717. Thus, the optimal timing strategy in this case is to
adopt the new technology when the firm expects that the
technology’s probability to win is greater than or equal to
. The optimal timing strategy helps the
firm to maximize its expected total investment payoff, but it
does not guarantee that the technology adopted will eventually
become the standards battle winner. Fig. 2 shows two sample
paths that illustrate that the technology adopted at the optimal
thresholds or can either succeed or fail in the stan-
dards competition. (See Fig. 2.)
According to the derivation of given in the Investment
Deferral Tradeoff Threshold Ratio Proposition, we find that
. So, in this case, if the exogenous gain in business
value when the technology becomes a standard is larger than
2.075 V, the result is that the optimal investment strategy is to
wait until one technology emerges as the winner.
B. Model Robustness
We also use computer simulation to obtain some Monte Carlo
results. Because a closed form solution is given in our model,
the primary goal of computer simulation is to test its robustness
rather than to generate numeric solutions. We used ANSI C to
code the simulation. With 0.03 as an increment in , we draw
the 100 000 sample average investment payoffs as a function of
in Fig. 3. We set the number of sample paths used in our simu-
lation to be sufficiently large to make sure that these sample av-
erage payoffs are very close to the expected investment payoffs.
Fig. 3(a) is a benchmark simulation where no parameter noise
has been introduced. It shows that the sample average payoff
function achieves its maximum at , which is very
close to the closed-form solution , given that the
increment in is 0.03 in the simulation. Fig. 3(b) shows the av-
erage sample payoffs when is uniformly distributed between
0 and 1. Again, the payoff function achieves its maximum at
. We let and both be uniformly distributed and
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Fig. 3. 100 000 sample average investment payoff as a function of w.
draw the sample average payoff function in Fig. 3(c). Here, we
also let be randomly drawn between 0.4 and 0.6: so the ex-
pected duration of technology competition could range from
2.8 years to 6.3 years in our simulation. We intentionally set
this wide range to test the limits of our model’s robustness. The
payoff curve reaches its peak at . The second highest
payoff is reached at , which is only 0.017% less than
the highest payoff.
V. DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND CONCLUSION
Since the dynamics of the technology competition process
play an important role in technology adoption, we proposed a
continuous-time real options model to explore this issue. We
next provide a managerial interpretation of the main findings of
this research, as a basis for assessing the usefulness of the ideas
in a variety of technology competition and adoption contexts.
We also will discuss the limitations of our approach, and the
agenda they prompt for future research.
A. Interpretation and Applicability of the Main Findings
Interpretation of the Managerial Contribution. Unlike
traditional real options models that stochastically model an
investment project’s value, our model uses a Brownian mo-
tion stochastic process to simulate changes over time in a
technology adopter’s expectations. This modeling approach
enjoys several distinctive advantages. First, decisionmakers’
expectations are continuously changing in the presence of new
information from the environment in which decisionmaking
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occurs. Unfortunately, multistage discrete-time models usu-
ally cannot accommodate this feature of the decisionmaking
process. Second, the information that arrives typically does so
in random fashion. But so long as managerial expectations are
rational and consistent, the memoryless and martingale proper-
ties of the stochastic process that we discussed turn out to be not
too hard to justify. So, in spite of some initial concerns that we
pointed out, we believe that our use of the standard Brownian
motion representation is a suitable modeling tool. Third, many
observers believe that managerial decisionmakers’ expectations
play a fundamental role in many strategic decisionmaking
processes. By characterizing managers’ expectations directly,
and incorporating them into a decisionmaking model for com-
peting technologies, the modeling approach that we used may
create power to analyze other decisionmaking problems under
uncertainty.
A major implication of our model is that a firm’s technology
adoption decisions are directly affected by what senior man-
agement decisionmakers expect to happen in the future. Since
waiting is usually expensive in a competitive environment, a
technology adopter needs an investment timing strategy to bal-
ance the tradeoff between waiting and preemption. Our model
shows that in a partial equilibrium setting the optimal invest-
ment time can be directly expressed as a function of the deci-
sionmaker’s expectations about the outcome of the standards
battle.
We also addressed the issues of technology switching costs
and lock-in within the context of technology investment timing.
If competing technologies are more compatible or they compete
within an open standard, the technology uncertainties may be
significantly reduced and firms may become more aggressive in
adopting new technologies. The major results of our model are
especially applicable to technology competition processes sub-
ject to strong network externalities. We have argued that tech-
nology adopters’ expectations may become more volatile in a
“tippy” market, and that this is caused by positive network feed-
back. Consequently, waiting may be more beneficial to adopters
because the technological uncertainties will be resolved sooner
due to the increase in the volatility of expectations. The actual
waiting time, as a result, may be significantly shortened because
the competition process itself usually ends much more quickly.
Breadth of Application. This approach to thinking about
technology competition and adoption has ready application in a
number of interesting new business environments involving IT.
For example, in the domain of digital wireless phone technolo-
gies, we currently see a proliferation of technology standards
around the world. Kauffman and Techatassanasoontorn [41],
[42] report empirical results at the national level of adoption
among countries throughout the world to show that the pres-
ence of multiple wireless standards slows down diffusion. In
this context, there are problems that exist at the level of the
firm, where the kind of managerial decisionmaking issues
arise that we have described. However, there is another aspect:
technology policymaking by regulators and government admin-
istrators may affect the technology economy. In the presence
of uncertainty about the outcome of technology competition,
these decisionmakers will be faced with the possibility of
creating technology adoption distortions through policymaking
that lead to inefficient growth and diffusion, as the information
they tap into and their expectations blend together. The primary
fear is that inappropriate expectations, possibly amplified by
the regulator’s distance from the actual process of firm-level
decisionmaking, may drive inefficient economic outcomes.
The same can be said for what may happen when firm-level
decisionmakers are unable to effectively process information
about competing technologies, and end up with inappropriate
expectations about the likely outcome. Kauffman and Li [39]
argue that there is a risk of rational herding, when decision-
makers at potential technology adopting firms misinterpret the
signals that are sent and received in the marketplace. Au and
Kauffman [4] further argue that this is a problem of rational
expectations, in which the information for technology adoption
decisionmaking is not able to be assembled all at once. Instead,
decisionmakers obtain impressions that are later weakened or
consolidated, based on their interactions with other potential
adopters in the marketplace, as well as vendors and other third
parties that may play an important role in the outcome. They
point out that the problem of gauging the potential of competing
technologies to achieve the status of de facto standard has oc-
curred with electronic bill payment and presentment technolo-
gies diffusion in the United States, slowing diffusion in the ab-
sence of an acknowledged standard.
A similar problem has been occurring with the diffusion of
fixed location wireless telephony, the so-called “Wi-Fi” tech-
nologies, but here also, we see an environment in the United
States characterized by the near simultaneous emergence in
time of multiple standards (including 802.11b, 802.11a, and
802.11g, etc.). The difficulties arise for manufacturers of
electronics products who wish to embed compatible wireless
technologies into their products, including handheld computers
and PDAs, sound electronics, electronic shelf management
technologies, computer peripherals, and wireless routers and
network equipment. They are faced with making uncertain
decisions about two aspects of the wireless standards: which
ones will become widely accepted by potential consumers of
the products they make, and how long the standards will be in
use before they are supplanted by the next innovation. Although
our model does not directly address this issue of “standards
stability,” the reader should recognize that the value of the real
options that an adopter possesses by making a commitment to a
current version of a standard is affected by a variety of market,
vendor, and technology innovation issues that are beyond the
managerial control of adopting firms. Indeed, this is generally
true in many technology adoption settings.
B. Limitations and Future Research
Limitations. We note three limitations of this research that de-
serve comment before we close out our discussion. First, even
though the underlying mathematics of the competing technolo-
gies analysis that we present are fairly complex, the concepts
that we have presented are relatively straightforward in concep-
tual terms for use by senior managers. Some may argue that
our first concerns should be with the technical details of the
modeling formulation—in particular, ensuring that the assump-
tions that go along with a standard Brownian motion stochastic
process with martingale features are precisely met. We chose a
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different approach though. Our goal was to find a way to make
an analogy between the technical details of the decision model
and the exigencies of its application in an appropriate manage-
rial context. We offered a technical argument to assuage the
reader’s fears that some of our model’s assumptions are too
stringent. However, we believe that the single best way to think
about our approach is in terms of the new capabilities it opens
up in support of managerial decisionmaking.
Second, although we have done some initial numerical anal-
ysis with our model to gauge its robustness across a number
of parameter values, there is a higher level test for robustness
that our model still has not measured up to: construct robust-
ness in various applied settings. Even though additional anal-
ysis work is beyond the scope of the present work, it will be ap-
propriate to conduct additional tests to see whether other issues
involving uncertainty that affect adoption decisionmaking can
be incorporated. Several related questions immediately come to
mind. What will happen when signals on the state of the tech-
nology relative to its becoming a standard in the market are fil-
tered or garbled or misread by an adopter, or are misrepresented
by a technology vendor? How can the model handle changes
in the key parameters, such as changed estimates of volatility,
or shifting perceptions of the adoption time line that firms face,
over the duration of the adoption period? Clearly, there is ad-
ditional evaluative work to be done with respect to the general
aspects of the modeling approach that we have presented.
Third, we have not yet fully validated this approach with a
real world test—something which also is beyond the scope of
the present work. This is desirable because we will need to find
ways to simplify the approach so that senior management de-
cisionmakers can work with the modeling parameters and con-
cepts. In prior work on the application of real options, for ex-
ample, Benaroch and Kauffman [12] found that managers did
not understand the concept of risk variances and the distribu-
tional mechanics that represent stochastic outcomes. This puts
a limitation on the application of the methods, since senior man-
agement decisionmakers need to be able to work within the
modeling constructs of a recommended evaluation approach to
represent their understanding of the technology adoption val-
uation issues in an applied, real world context. Understanding
risks and variances is critical to successful use of the approach
that we propose.
Future Research. Since technology vendors can proactively
influence adopters’ timing decisions, an interesting direction
for future research is to address the timing issue in a general
equilibrium model, to determine policies for adopting firms in a
multipartite (i.e., with multiple vendors and adopters) competi-
tive context. In such a model, game theory is arguably the ideal
tool, as suggested by Huisman [34], Grenadier [32], and Zhu
[76], and the role of strategic expectations should be the focal
point. Once vendors’ strategies become endogenous to a deci-
sionmaking model, the information asymmetry between tech-
nology adopters and vendors will emerge, affecting the manner
in which each approaches a decision about when to adopt and
when to push toward the next standard. In most cases, tech-
nology vendors will hold private information about their firms’
plans with the technology, the schedule for releasing the next-
generation versions, the speed of development, and so on. As a
result, informational asymmetry should be built into adopters’
expectations. Game-theoretic real options analysis can also be
applied to situations where the competitive dynamics between
technology adopters significantly impact their equilibrium in-
vestment strategies. For example, the technological innovation
investment model in Grenadier and Weiss [31] is generalized
by Huisman and Kort [35] to a duopolistic real options game.
Huisman and Kort [36] further extend their duopolistic game
to scenarios where the future technology arrives stochastically.
Their insightful works clearly indicate one promising direction
in which our model can be extended. Specifically, future studies
should consider not only the technology competition as mod-
eled here, but also the business competition among technology
adopters whose investment strategies dynamically interact with
each other.
This paper only models the dynamics of competition between
two technologies, but we believe that there are at least two ap-
proaches that can help extend our model to the more general
scenario, where a manager tries to adopt one of competing
technologies. The first approach requires the use of a multidi-
mensional Brownian motion. The increment of such a Brownian
motion has an -dimensional normal distribution. A band can
be defined on each axis, and a winning technology will emerge
the first time when the coordinates of the Brownian motion go
beyond the band associated with the technology. Mathemati-
cally, the bands defined on the axes can establish a compact
set. Each point in this set can represent a vector of probabilities
, where is the probability for technology
to win the competition. So the Brownian motion can stochasti-
cally characterize the uncertainties surrounding the competition
among the technologies. The advantage of this approach is
that the standard properties of multidimensional Brownian mo-
tion can be applied. For example, the martingale property of
multidimensional Brownian motion can still be used to link it
to decisionmakers’ expectations.8
The second approach only needs a standard Brownian motion
defined in a two-dimensional Euclidean space, but it requires
some geometric manipulation. For example, the trajectory of a
standard Brownian motion in a triangle, as in Fig. 4, can be used
to depict the competition process of three technologies.
Mathematically, each point in such a triangle can charac-
terize the expected probability and time for each technology
to win the competition. For both approaches, we doubt that
closed-form optimal threshold solutions are derivable in most
situations. However, recent advances in computation power and
optimization algorithms should make it relatively straightfor-
ward to find numerical solutions.
Because it is impossible to give closed-form solutions for
many complicated real options models, computer simulations
and other computationally intensive approaches are suitable re-
search tools [19], [29]. Although we derived a closed-form so-
lution in this study of competing technologies, the reader should
recognize that closed-from solutions are very difficult to de-
rive in many other situations where real options analysis is ap-
propriate. Fortunately, the newly available capabilities of com-
8See Durrett [25] for a proof. The downside of this approach is that rigor-
ously applying multidimensional martingales requires mathematical knowledge
beyond a first graduate course in real analysis (e.g., [69]).
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Fig. 4. Brownian motion characterization of the standards battle among three
competing technologies.
puting resources make it possible, consistent with widespread
advances in methodologies for computational finance, statistics
and econometrics, to do numerical experiments and simulations
that would not have been cost-effective only a few years ago.
These new computationally intensive methods permit us to ask
new and more refined research questions involving real options
valuation in important applied settings. The answers that we are
now able to obtain will help to guide senior management de-
cisionmaking related to technology adoption and advance the
frontiers of management science for decisionmaking under un-
certainty.
APPENDIX A
UNDERSTANDING REAL OPTIONS: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION
The seminal works of Black and Scholes [15] and Merton
[58] offer us a standard pricing model for financial options. To-
gether with another colleague at MIT, Stewart Myers, they rec-
ognized that option pricing theory could be applied to real as-
sets and nonfinancial investments. To differentiate options on
real assets from financial options traded in the market, Myers
coined the term “real options.” Today, that term has been widely
accepted in the academic and business world. Many observers
believe that the real options approach can play an important role
in financial evaluation related to projects that are undertaken in
the highly uncertain and technology-driven digital economy. We
will present a simple example to give readers some useful intu-
ition and an illustration of the value associated with real options
and their significance in capital budgeting.
A. Real Options Example: This Year or Next Year?
Imagine that a software company is facing a new investment
opportunity. It plans to spend $100 000 to make its best-selling
database system compatible with an emerging operating system
(OS) in the market, but new OS is still in its infancy, so the com-
pany is not sure whether it will be widely accepted in the future.
Suppose that uncertainty about the new OS can be totally re-
solved next year, and that the company is trying to maximize
its expected return from the $100 000 investment project. Ac-
cording to the company’s estimation, the new OS has a 50%
chance to be widely accepted next year. In this case, the ex-
pected increased cash inflow from this investment is estimated
to be $15 000 a year. In the case that the OS is not popular next
year, the expected annual net cash inflow from this project will
be $7000. Further suppose that the discount rate for this invest-
ment project is 10%, the net present value (NPV) of this project
can be calculated as
Since the NPV of this project is positive, it seems that the
firm should go ahead with this project. However, the conclusion
is incorrect. Why? It does not account for the value of the option
to defer the investment to the next year. Next, suppose that the
company waits one year to watch the market’s reaction to the
new OS. If a favorable situation occurs, then it will proceed to
invest; otherwise, it will no longer pursue the project. Then, the
NPV of this project will be
Evidently, it is better to take the option of deferring the
investment to the next year. The value of this option is
$22 727 $10 000 $12 727. Let us further suppose that
someone in the company argues that the investment costs will
increase in the next year. But still, further calculation shows
that the option will be valuable even if the costs rise as high as
$127 000 in the next year. Basically, this simple example shows
the value of an option of deferring investment.
We now review the basic tools and concepts of option pricing
theory, beginning with a definition. An option is the right, but
not the obligation, to buy (a call) or sell (a put) an asset at a
prespecified price on or before a specified date. For financial
option contracts, the underlying assets are usually stocks. Until
the late 1960s, researchers in Finance were unable to find a rig-
orous method to price options on stock. However, Black and
Scholes [15] and Merton [58], using methods from infinitesimal
calculus and the concept of dynamic portfolio hedging, success-
fully specified the fundamental partial differential equation that
must be satisfied by the value of the call option, which permitted
them to give the analytical solution known as the Black–Scholes
formula for the value of an option.
Following the revolution in option pricing theory that the
Black–Scholes model caused, many researchers recognized the
new potential of this theory in capital budgeting. Traditional
DCF methods were recognized for their inherent limitations:
they did not yield effective estimates of value related to project
investments with strategic options and many uncertainties.
Myers [61] showed that a firm’s discretionary investment
options are components of its market value. Mason and Merton
[55] discussed the role of option pricing theory in corporate
finance. Kulatilaka and Marks [44] also discuss the strategic
value of managerial flexibility and its option like properties.
Table II lists the similarities between an American call option
on a stock and a real option on an investment project. Despite
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TABLE II
COMPARISON BETWEEN AN AMERICAN CALL OPTION AND A REAL OPTION ON A PROJECT
the close analogy, some still question the applicability of option
pricing theory to real options that usually are not traded in a
market. However, Cox, et al. [21] and McDonald and Siegel
[56] suggest that a contingent claim on nontraded assets can be
priced with the adjustment of its growth rate by subtracting a
dividend-like risk premium.
Based on this solid theoretical foundation, many researchers
have investigated the valuation of various real options in the
business world. One of the most basic real options models was
developed by McDonald and Siegel [57]. In their model, they
discuss the optimal time for a firm to invest in a proprietary
project whose value evolves according to a stochastic process
called geometric Brownian motion. Their results suggest that the
option to defer an investment may be very valuable under some
circumstances. Ingersoll and Ross [37] also discussed the option
of waiting to invest and its relation with uncertainty. Brennan
and Schwartz [17] examined the joint decisions to invest and
abandon a project. Kulatilaka and Trigeorgis [46] adopted real
option theory to value the managerial flexibility to switch inputs
and outputs. Grenadier [30] discussed how to value lease con-
tracts by real options theory. The interested reader should see
Li [51] for additional details on the applications of real options
theory to technology related business problems.
APPENDIX B
MATHEMATICAL PROOFS OF KEY FINDINGS
A. Proof of Theorem 1—Optimal Investment Timing Strategy
Theorem
Before a company invests in a new technology project, it will
have an option to invest in the project. This value of this op-
tion is denoted by . It must satisfy a Bellman equilibrium
differential equation, , in the con-
tinuation region, where there are values of for which it is not
optimal to invest.
Note that we need three conditions to solve the differential
equation. The reason is that the optimal investment threshold
is a free boundary of the continuation region. The first con-
dition is a value-matching condition , which
says that upon investing, the expected payoff will be .
The second condition is a smooth-pasting condition,
, that is necessary to guarantee that the threshold point
is the true optimal exercise point for the real option [22].
The third is a symmetry condition , which
comes directly from the symmetric structure of our model’s
specification.
We note that, in some cases, will be outside .
This means that the continuation region goes beyond the de-
cision region, and so the optimal strategy is to invest when
reaches either or , the boundaries of the decision re-
gion. To satisfy the equilibrium differential equation and the
third condition, it turns out that the solution must take the form
. In this expression, is
a constant to be computed and values of occur within the con-
tinuation region. The other two conditions can be used to solve
for the two remaining unknowns, the constant and the op-
timal investment threshold . The positive optimal investment
threshold and constant must also satisfy the equations
shown at the bottom of the page, where and are defined
where we derive . The solution to the system of equations
is given by
The reader should note that we assume , and
, otherwise. Similarly, the negative threshold and can
be solved as follows:
The negative optimal investment threshold will be if
is beyond . We also know the values of the two
thresholds and , where . So for a given
, the firm should invest immediately if is out-
side of . If , the firm should adopt a
technology once reaches either or . If reaches
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first, then the firm will adopt Technology since
, but if it reaches first, then Technology will be
adopted because .
B. Proof of Proposition 1—Investment Deferral Tradeoff
Threshold Ratio Proposition
From Theorem 1, we know that the optimal investment
threshold is or if the following inequality,
,
holds. Since is monotonically increasing, the inequality
is equivalent to
. The term , can be simplified as
. This inequality will hold if
. Otherwise, the inequality will be
equivalent to .
As .
We prove that the optimal investment threshold will be-
come and when is greater than or equal to ,
where . The




C. Proof of Proposition 2—Comparative Statics Proposition)
We know that for any , we have
. In
the proof for Proposition 1, we showed that the term, , can
be simplified as . From
this, we can prove that ,
, and . Since ,
and is monotonically increasing, we can further
deduce that , , and .
In addition, we know that and
. This permits us to
conclude that and . This completes
the proof.
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